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Compensability of Stress Heart Attacks in
Pennsylvania
Charles F. Quinn*
Perhaps no illness has caused more national concern than cardiovascular disease. It constitutes the number one killer in this
country:' of the nearly two million people a year who suffer heart
attacks, approximately 600,000 die.2 Due to the serious effects of the
disease, medical experts have been investigating its causes in an
effort to arrest its spread. Emotional anxiety and stress have been
suggested as major contributors to heart disease and coronary attacks.'
The purpose of this article is to examine the possibility of redress
under workmen's compensation law in Pennsylvania when stress or
emotional strain on the job is identified as the precipitating cause
of heart disease in an employee. Although heart attacks had been
recognized as compensable injuries in Pennsylvania, the established
criteria required for compensation under the workmen's compensation law until 1972 precluded recovery for attacks induced by stress.
This article looks at those traditional requirements and the modifications made possible by amendment of the statute as well as the
development of case law. It is submitted that in order to be consistent with the underlying policy of permitting recovery for work* B.A., St. Joseph's College, 1955; LL.B., University of Pennsylvania, 1960; Workmen's
Compensation Editor, The Barrister; Member, Philadelphia Bar.
1. Editor's Introduction to Medical Aspects of CoronaryCare Nursing, in LEGAL MEDICINE
ANNUAL 1974, at 199 (C. Wecht ed. 1974).
2. Wecht, Coronary Care Units: Legal Considerations,in LEGAL MEDICINE ANNUAL 1974,
at 211 (C. Wecht ed. 1974).
3. "There are several possible mechanisms through which ... emotional stresses increase
cardiac work." 8 TRAUMATIC MEDICINE AND SURGERY FOR THE ATrORNEY 610 (1962). Emotional
stress is capable of physically affecting the function of the heart. For example, it produces
increases in the heart beat rate and causes other electrocardiographic changes. A positive
correlation has been found between emotional stress and heart attacks. Emotional stress has
been identified as a major factor in the events preceding the onset of congestive heart failure.
3 CYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE, SURGERY, SPECIALTIES 1305 (1975). See also 5 TRAUMA 5:23 (Feb.
1964) for results of a study by Morris concluding that emotional strain often precipitates heart
disease. "Acute emotional stress, fear, anger and chronic anxiety are important factors in
precipitation of heart failure in instances of pre-existing heart disease." 8 TRAUMATIC MEDICINE AND SURGERY FOR THE ATrORNEY 610 (1962).
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related injuries, and in recognition of medical findings in the area
of cardiovascular disease, the amended law should allow recovery to
heart attack victims whose illnesses were induced by stress related
to the work environment.
Few people would question the necessity of workmen's compensation laws in a modem industrial society. By enacting such laws,
legislatures have attempted to efficiently allocate to the consumer
public the cost of an employee's work-connected injuries.4 Traditionally, the touchstone for the reallocation of these costs had been
an "accident" in the course of the worker's employment. The requirement of an accident for recovery was adopted either judicially
or legislatively by most states, including Pennsylvania.' Con4. 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 2.20, at 5 (1972).
5. Prior to its amendment in 1972, the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act declared:
When employer and employe shall by agreement, .... accept the provisions of article
three of this act, compensation for personal injury to, or for the death of such employe,
by an accident, in the course of his employment, shall be paid in all cases by the
employer ....
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 431 (1952), as amended, (Supp. 1976) (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted).
"Injury" and "personal injury" were defined as follows:
The terms "injury" and "personal injury," . . . shall be construed to mean only
violence to the physical structure of the body, and such disease or infection as naturally results therefrom; and wherever death is mentioned as a cause for compensation
under this act, it shall mean only death resulting from such violence and its resultant
effects ....
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 411 (1952), as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 411(1) (Supp. 1976).
Although the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act defined "injury" and "personal
injury," the defining of "accident" was left up to the courts. The premier treatment of this
problem was in Lacey v. Washburn & Williams Co., 309 Pa. 574, 164 A. 724 (1933), where
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared:
The word accident - as used in the act - must be interpreted in its usual, ordinary,
popular sense. Webster has defined it as "an event that takes place without one's
foresight or expectation; an undesigned, sudden, and unexpected event; chance; contingency." Many courts have quoted this definition, and some have added to or embellished it, but in reality few have improved upon it. It would answer no good purpose
to call attention to the many immaterial variations and additions. Our decisions interpreting the word as used in our compensation law have substantially clung to this
meaning. In McCauley v. Imperial Woolen Co., 261 Pa. 312, 327, we said: "If the
incident which gives rise to the injurious results complained of can be classed properly
as a 'mishap,' or 'fortuitous' happening - an 'untoward event, which is not expected
or designed' - it is an accident within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation
Law." ...
In Lane v. Horn & Hardart Baking Co., 261 Pa. 329, 333, we said: "Wherever death is mentioned in the statute, it means death resulting only from unforeseen
violence to the physical structure of the body and its resultant effects . . . or, in other
words, death from 'an accident.'"
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strained by this accident requirement, but desirous of fulfilling the
humanitarian purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Act,'
Pennsylvania courts were forced to create numerous exceptions to
permit recovery,7 which made application of the accident requirement extremely unpredictable.' Particular problems were confronted when the courts were asked to grant compensation for workrelated heart attacks.'
Pennsylvania amended its workmen's compensation law in 1972
in response to judicial pleas for legislative action.'0 The most significant statutory change was a concept of "injury" substituted for the
requirement of an "accident."" The new standard should lessen the
309 Pa. at 577, 164 A. at 725.
6. The Pennsylvania Superior Court has noted:
It may be trite to again point out that the Workmen's Compensation Law is a remedial
Act passed for the benefit of workers, authorized by the police powers of the State and
is frequently referred to as a humanitarian measure. . . . For this purpose it must be
liberally construed.
Dupree v. Barney, 193 Pa. Super. 331, 336, 163 A.2d 901, 904 (1960) (citation omitted).
7. See Comment, Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation: An Analysis of Persistent
Problems and Recent Legislative Reform, 76 DICK. L. REv. 445, 456-57 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Workmen's Compensation].
8. In York v. State Workmen's Ins. Fund, 131 Pa. Super. 496, 498, 200 A. 230, 231 (1938),
the Pennsylvania Superior Court was forced to admit that "those [accidents] that are
compensatory and those that are not compensatory are divided by a line which at times
appears indistinct." Commenting upon the accident requirement in the heart cases, Judge
Hoffman of the superior court declared:
The profuse litigation revolving around the accident concept has not only built up a
retaining wall against liability in heart cases by a distortion of the language of the Act
in light of its derivation and legislative purpose, but has also provided a great source
of difficulty in defining a workable rule.
Hamilton v. Procon, Inc., 211 Pa. Super. 446, 460, 236 A.2d 819, 826 (1967) (Hoffman, J.,
dissenting), rev'd, 434 Pa. 90, 252 A.2d 601 (1969).
9. A problem created by the accident requirement in the heart cases is that heart ailments
normally develop over a long period of time. Also, the causation factor between the work
performance and the cardiovascular injury is more difficult to demonstrate because of the
obscure relationship between the two. See Comment, A Reappraisalof the "Unusual Exertion" Doctrine in the "Heart Cases" under Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Law, 46
TEMP. L.Q. 126, 127 (1972). For a criticism of the use of "accident" as the basis for granting
compensation in heart cases see Larson, The "Heart Cases" in Workmen's Compensation:
An Analysis and Suggested Solution, 65 MIcH. L. Rv. 441 (1967).
"Heart cases" refers to the label given by Larson to those decisions involving injuries
designated by the layman 'as heart attack,' 'heart failure,' 'heart damage,' 'precipitation of
heart disease,' or 'aggravation of heart condition.'" 1A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION § 38.30 at 36 (1973).
10. Hamilton v. Procon, Inc., 434 Pa. 90, 100, 252 A.2d 601, 606 (1969).
11. Act of Oct. 17, 1972, No. 223, § 2, [1972] Laws of Pa. 930, amending Act of March
29, 1972, No. 61, § 7, [19721 Laws of Pa. 159, amending Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 77, § 411 (1952)
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former difficulties in permitting compensation for heart attacks.
Moreover, the "injury" standard of compensability is applicable to
heart attacks induced purely from emotional distress.
Under the former provisions of the Pennsylvania Workmen's
Compensation Act,'" at least four categories of "accidents" were
deemed compensable.' 3 They included an injury caused by: (1) a
blow or physical trauma;" (2) unusual exertion which required an
unusual amount of effort;" (3) an unusual pathological result;'" or
(4) failure of the employer to provide adequate medical treatment.'7
Since few cases are litigated where the heart attack is caused by a
blow or physical trauma,' the question of recovery in most heart
attack cases had been decided on the basis of proof that the employee had unusually exerted himself 9 in the performance of some
(now codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 411(1) (Supp. 1976). For the text of the amended
statute see text accompanying note 31 infra.
12. See note 5 supra.
13. See Hinkle v. H.J. Heinz Co., 7 Pa. Commw. 216, 222, 298 A.2d 632, 635-36 (1972).
One commentator has suggested that with heart injuries, there are five categories of compensable accidents. See generally McLaughlin, The Compensability of Heart Injuries Under the
Pennsylvania Workmen's CompensationAct, 21 U. PrTt. L. REv. 445 (1960) [hereinafter cited
as McLaughlin].
14. See, e.g., Yodis v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 269 Pa. 586, 113 A. 73
(1921).
15. See Hamilton v. Procon, 434 Pa. 90, 252 A.2d 601 (1969); Royko v. Logan Coal Co.,
146 Pa. Super. 449, 462, 22 A.2d 434, 440 (1941).
16. See note 19 infra.
17. See, e.g., Baur v. Mesta Mach. Co., 405 Pa. 617, 176 A.2d 684 (1961).
18. See McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 457.
19. For, the origin of the unusual exertion doctrine in Pennsylvania see McLaughlin, supra
note 13, at 459-61. In establishing unusual strain, three questions had to be answered in order
for the claimant to recover: (1) was the task unusual work for the decedent or claimant; (2)
was there unusual effort or exertion; and (3) was the unusual strain or exertion the cause of
the decedent's death or the claimant's injury. Pudlosky v. Follmer Truck Co., 206 Pa. Super.
450, 214 A.2d 270 (1965).
The next most widely invoked avenue for compensation in the heart cases was the unusual
pathological result. This test was originated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Parks v.
Miller Printing Mach. Co., 336 Pa. 455, 459, 9 A.2d 742, 744 (1939). The test was part of an
overall effort by the court to guide the adjudication of a perplexing and repetitious issue:
whether prostration or a disease contracted as a result of exposure to heat, cold or other
unusual environmental conditions constituted an accident under the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act. The unusual pathological result test declares that where an employee sustains a sudden and unexpected injury while voluntarily performing work under
ordinary and normal circumstances, he is entitled to compensation. See, e.g., Wance v. Gettig
Eng'r. & Mfg. Co., 204 Pa. Super. 297, 204 A.2d 492 (1964) (torn knee cartilage as a result of
continuous pedaling is an unusual pathological result). Applying this theory to a heart attack
situation, the heart attack would be compensable where a healthy employee suffers an attack
while working under normal conditions; the absence of any prior heart trouble would by

1976

Stress Heart Attacks

work-related effort. 0 Pennsylvania law also required proof that the
effort was unusual to the claimant's occupation." For example,
prior to 1969, if a carpenter sustained a heart attack, it was necessary for him to show that the work-related effort which was claimed
to be an unusual act was over and above what an ordinary carpenter
would do on an ordinary day.2 Therefore, as in other work injuries,
there was "an objective standard of unusuality" which had to be
pleaded and proved in order to sustain an award of benefits in workrelated heart attack cases.
In 1969, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court replaced the objective
standard of unusuality with a subjective one in the landmark case
of Hamilton v. Procon, Inc.13 Although the supreme court retained
the unusual strain doctrine, the court indicated its displeasure with
it and urged legislative action.2 4 The court found the doctrine faulty
in three respects. The first flaw was its prerequisite that "the accidental character of an injury must be found in the cause, rather
than in the result. ' 2 5 The court declared that the requirement's
emphasis on cause, rather than result, was "especially anomalous
in Pennsylvania ' 26 since Pennsylvania had already recognized the
unusual pathological result test which placed the emphasis entirely
on result." Secondly, the court noted that the doctrine erroneously
inference indicate that the attack was caused by some external element or force. Hamilton
v. Procon, Inc., 211 Pa. Super. 446, 451 n.2, 236 A.2d 819, 821 n.2 (1967) (Hoffman, J.,
dissenting), rev 'd, 434 Pa. 90, 252 A.2d 601 (1969). For a treatment of the unusual pathological
result test in heart cases see McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 472-82. See generally Barbieri &
Quinn, The Unusual PathologicalResult Doctrine in Pennsylvania,39 TEMP. L.Q. 51 (1965).
20. See, e.g., Miller v. Fred Schiffner & Sons, 196 Pa. Super. 84, 173 A.2d 707 (1961);
Sadusky v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 139 Pa. Super. 595, 12 A.2d 828 (1940).
21. See, e.g., Lorigan v. W.O. Gulbranson, Inc., 184 Pa. Super. 251, 132 A.2d 695 (1957);
Lemmon v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Highways, 164 Pa. Super. 254, 63 A.2d 684 (1949).
22. See, e.g., Billick v. Republic Steel Corp., 214 Pa. Super. 267, 257 A.2d 589 (1969)
(lumberman's heart attack not due to unusual strain); McGowan v. Upper Darby Pet Supply,
207 Pa. Super. 329, 217 A.2d 846 (1966) (meat cutter's heart attack after carrying meat not
due to unusual exertion); Pudlosky v. Follmer Trucking Co., 206 Pa. Super. 450, 214 A.2d
270 (1965) (truck driver's heart attack after attaching chains to truck not caused by unusual
exertion); Urbasik v. City of Johnstown, 198 Pa. Super. 232, 182 A.2d 90 (1962) (fireman's
heart attack after driving old fire truck not caused by unusual exertion); Bonaduce v.
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 190 Pa. Super. 319, 154 A.2d 298 (1959) (engineer's
heart attack after overhauling heavy machinery not accidental since the work was similar to
that performed in the past).
23. 434 Pa. 90, 252 A.2d 601 (1969).
24. Id. at 96, 252 A.2d at 604.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See note 19 supra.
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assumed "that that which is unusual is necessarily accidental.""
Finally, the court stated that the doctrine was unworkable because
it was too difficult to interpret what an unusual strain was in a
particular situation. 29 Having determined that the unusual strain
doctrine was vulnerable for three reasons, the court in Hamilton
held that the doctrine was to be applied "according to the work
history of the individual involved and not according to the work
patterns of his profession in general."30 The unanimous supreme
court decision was a legal giant step toward allowing workmen's
compensation recoveries for those who suffered work-related heart
attacks and provided the intellectual genesis for legislative change
in the law.
A new standard for compensability for any employee injury was
set forth in the 1972 amendments to the Pennsylvania Workmen's
Compensation Act. The relevant section states:
The terms "injury" and "personal injury," as used in this act,
shall be construed to mean an injury to an employe, regardless
of his previous physical condition, arising in the course of his
employment and related thereto, and such disease or infection
as naturally results from the injury or is aggravated, reacti31
vated or accelerated by the injury ....
The fulcrum of compensability under the 1972 amendments is not
an employee's "accident," but an "injury arising out of the course
of his employment and related thereto"; this standard expands the
entire basis of compensation.32 Futhermore, language in the amendments indicates legislative intent to include those injuries which
may have only a tangential relationship to the premises of the employer.3 3 Perhaps most significant for heart attack victims, the injury may be compensable regardless of the employee's previous
28. Hamilton v. Procon, 434 Pa. 90, 96, 252 A.2d 601, 604, (1969), citing Royko v. Logan
Coal Co., 146 Pa. Super. 449, 462, 22 A.2d 434, 440 (1941).
29. 434 Pa. at 97, 252 A.2d at 604.
30. 434 Pa. at 99, 252 A.2d at 605.
31. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 411(1) (Supp. 1976), amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 411
(1952).
32. Compare text of the amended statutory provision, text accompanying note 31 supra,
with the former provisions, note 5 supra.
33. The only express exclusions from the ambit of compensability provided by the legislature are those personal assault cases where an employee is injured by the assault of a third
person arising out of a purely personal dispute in a matter not related to the business interests
of the employer. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 411(1) (Supp. 1976).
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medical condition; past medical history is not even to be considered
as a causative factor. 3 Few cases in the commonwealth court have
involved interpretation of the new standard; those the court has
considered suggest a liberal construction will be applied. In
Workmen's CompensationAppeal Board v. ChamberlainManufacturing Corp.,35 the court first referred to the new standard.3 The
case involved a claimant who had sustained a hernia while performing his normal work duties in an unusual manner. The claimant
could not be treated by remedial surgery because of a confessed
alcoholic problem and related liver damage. Despite the history of*
alcoholism, the court found that the hernia was compensable under
the new standard. The commonwealth court in Workmen's
Compensation Appeal Board v. Jeddo Highland Coal Co., 37 was
faced with the issue of whether a fatal heart attack suffered by the
claimant's husband was a compensable injury under the newly
amended Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act. Based on a
physician's testimony that the heart attack was related to heavy
lifting by the decedent at work, the court held that the attack was
38
compensable.
It would be consistent with the new standard to include stress
heart attacks as compensable injuries. However, notwithstanding
the Chamberlain39 and Jeddo'0 decisions, victims of stress-related
heart attacks should be wary; since the standard is still developing,
there may be obstacles to overcome in order to obtain relief. Old
case law lobbies against recovery,' and it is still unclear how a stress
heart attack may be proven. Under the old law, there was a legacy
of cases which frowned upon emotional fright or excitation as a2
foundation for a compensable injury under Pennsylvania law.
These precedents against compensation should not inhibit recoveries for stress heart attacks under the new law, despite a tendency
34. See Workmen's Compensation, supra note 7, at 465 & n.148.
35. 18 Pa. Commw. 572, 336 A.2d 659 (1975).
36. Id. at 576, 336 A.2d at 661.
37. 19 Pa. Commw. 90, 338 A.2d 744 (1975).
38. Id. at 94, 338 A.2d at 747.
39. 18 Pa. Commw. 572, 336 A.2d 659 (1975).
40. 19 Pa. Commw. 90, 338 A.2d 744 (1975).
41. See notes 19-22 and accompanying text supra.
42. See, e.g., Liscio v. S. Makransky & Sons, 147 Pa. Super. 483, 24 A.2d 136 (1942);
Fesenbek v. City of Philadelphia, 144 Pa. Super. 99, 18 A.2d 448 (1941); Hoffman v. Rhoads
Constr. Co., 113 Pa. Super. 55, 172 A. 33 (1934). But see Hunter v. St. Mary's Natural Gas
Co., 122 Pa. Super. 300, 186 A. 325 (1936).
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of lawyers to carry old case law into the interpretations of new
legislative standards. Indeed, there is nothing in the legislation that
currently exists, or in the recent decisions of the commonwealth
court involving the new amendments, which precludes an award of
benefits for a stress heart attack. The question of what constitutes
adequate proof of a stress heart attack may also be answered: if a
credible medical witness supports the conclusion that either physical or emotional stress on the job induced the heart attack, and if
that evidence is believed by the referee and affirmed by the board,
the commonwealth court should uphold the finding.43 Certainly,
where the stress-related heart attack occurs at work, or immediately
after completing a job-related task, there is more rational support
for an award of benefits under the amended law than there was for
some heart attack awards under the "accident" standard; indeed,
under the old standard there have been a number of decisions
awarding recovery for heart attacks on rather questionable grounds.
For instance, in Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board v. Allied
Chemical Corp.," decedent had suffered burn injuries at the Allied
Chemical plant in 1966 and was similarly injured in 1970. He died
of a heart attack in 1973. Although the hiatus between injury and
death was protracted, the referee found that the individual accidents of 1966 and 1970 hastened and accelerated the death of the
decedent. Because the expert opinion of a doctor was deemed credible by the referee, the commonwealth court affirmed the referee's
conclusion." The tenuous link between the injuries in 1966 and 1970
and the heart attack in 1973 was established by the doctor's testimony that the injuries prematurely induced the heart attack. In
contrast to Allied Chemical Corp., there is far more reason to hold
a stress heart attack compensable under the 1972 amendments.
However, since Allied Chemical Corp. involved clear "industrial
accidents," there was a somewhat slavish adherence to the old,
familiar "accident" formula in order to permit recovery.
The current Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board appears to
have laid the groundwork for upholding compensability of stress
43. In a workman's compensation case, the referee is the fact finder; thus, he is entitled
to weigh the evidence. The commonwealth court has often held that if the referee's verdict is
supported by the evidence, it will be upheld. See, e.g., Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. v. Kanell
Jewelers, 22 Pa. Commw. 1, 3, 347 A.2d 500, 501 (1975); Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. v.
Continental Meat Co., 22 Pa. Commw. 37, 40, 347 A.2d 318, 320 (1975).
44. 20 Pa. Commw. 562, 342 A.2d 766 (1975).
45. Id. at 566, 342 A.2d at 768.
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heart attacks in Pennsylvania under the new standard. In Squillacioti v. Bernard S. Pincus Co.," the board indicated that a stress
heart attack was compensable. 7 According to the chairman, no accident is necessary; no proof of overexertion is required. The preexistence of cardiovascular disease is also unimportant. The only
prerequisite for recovery under the amended law is that there be a
true causal nexus - either physical or emotional4 8 - between the
victim's employment and the development of a heart condition. The
decision was affirmed by the commonwealth court."6
The Squillacioti decision is laudable because it demonstrates the
proper focus of the 1972 amendments: cause and effect is the touchstone of compensability. Under the old law, there was an almost
obsessional concern with the nature of the cause;5" under the new
law, the nature of the cause is irrelevant. The old law denied recovery for heart attacks when it was asserted they were related to workconnected stress.5" The 1972 amendments appear to permit recovery
when an injury involves work-related stress and therefore are in line
with current medical thinking that stress can cause heart ailments.52
Further support for this interpretation of the 1972 amendments
may be garnered from decisions in several other states which have
declared that emotionally induced heart attacks are compensable.
The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that a heart attack precipitated by the frustrations of on-the-job personality conflicts is com46. No. A-69097 (Work. Comp. App. Bd. April 17, 1975), af'd sub nor. Workmen's
Comp. App. Bd. v. Bernard S. Pincus Co., 357 A.2d 707 (Pa. Commw. 1976).
47. The board determined that the new statutory language in Pennyslvania is similar to
the California workmen's compensation statute. Accordingly, the board referred to California
case law in determining what is meant by "an injury arising out of employment," and noted
that the California Supreme Court has held that'heart attacks induced by emotional stress
are compensable. The board went on to state: "we conclude that Pennsylvania is in accord
with the California policy." No. A-69097 (Work. Comp. App. Bd. April 17, 1975) at 11. See
note 55 and accompanying text infra.
48. No. A-69097 (Work. Comp. App. Bd. April 17, 1975) at 11.
49. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. v. Bernard S. Pincus Co., 357 A.2d 707 (Pa. Commw.
1976). The opinion asserted: "This Court has repeatedly held that where a decedent . . . was
performing his usual job assignment at the time of his fatal heart attack, and the connection
between his work and the heart attack was supported by testimony of a physician, that the
death was directly related to his work, decedent's claimant was entitled to benefits [under
the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act]." Id. at 708.
50. See notes 14-22 and accompanying text supra.
51. See, e.g., McGaw v. Town of Bloomsburg, 214 Pa. Super. 342, 257 A.2d 622 (1969);
Bussone v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 210 Pa. Super. 442, 234 A.2d 195 (1967); Everitt v. Baker
Refrigerator Co., 197 Pa. Super. 611, 180 A.2d 114 (1962).
52. See note 3 supra.
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pensable.5 3 According to the court, recovery should not be denied,
even though the employee's heart condition had developed over a
period of months.54 The California Court of Appeals has concluded:
"[I]t is well-settled that an employee subjected to repeated physical or mental strain over an extended period of time who suffers a
vascular accident as a result thereof is entitled to compensation.' '5
New York similarly has recognized the compensability of a heart
attack caused by anxiety. In Lagona v. Starpoint Central School,5"
an assistant principal, who had been exhausted by a particularly
trying day at school, suffered a heart attack on the way home. The
court held that the facts met the test that a heart attack is compensable if the events inducing the heart attack involved "undue stress
and strain beyond the ordinary wear and tear of life."57 Recently,
Georgia awarded compensation for a stress heart attack58 sustained
by a policeman shortly after he went on duty. The policeman had
been fearful of losing his job; he rode alone in his patrol car and was
required to cover an area that was too large for one man to handle;
additionally, he had just been transferred. The court held that his
heart attack was compensable even though a doctor's expert testimony went only so far as to suggest that "work-connected emotional
stress might or could have contributed to his heart attack."5
53. Mississippi Research & Dev. Center v. Dependents of Shults, 287 So. 2d 273 (Miss.
1973).
54. Id. at 276. The heart attack victim was known to work longer, more intense hours than
the average employee; he had also become nervous and unhappy with his employment. It was
held that a resulting heart attack was an " 'injury . . .arising out of and in the course of
employment.' " Id. at 275 (citation omitted).
55. Greenberg v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 37 Cal. App. 3d 792, 798, 112 Cal. Rptr.
626, 629 (1974). A pharmacist customarily filled about 30 percent more prescriptions each day
than the average pharmacist. The court found that the employee's extraordinary work load
made his job stressful, and allowed recovery for a heart attack. The court ruled it did not
matter that the victim was considerably overweight or that there was a history of cardiac
illness in the victim's family.
56. 50 App. Div. 2d 236, 377 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1975).
57. Id. at 237, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 681. The court concluded that the heart attack was
compensable since it was brought on by overexertion or strain in the course of the victim's
daily work, even though a preexisting pathology may have been a contributing factor. But
see Millar v. Town of Newburgh, 43 App. Div. 2d 641, 349 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1973), where the
court determined that an employee could not recover for a heart attack. Emotional stress
apparently had resulted from the company's hiring of a new employee at better pay. The court
reasoned that all individuals experience conflicts at work, and if all illnesses stemming from
these confrontations were compensable, there would be no way to place a limit upon workmen's compensation recoveries.
58. City Council v. Williams, 137 Ga. App. 177, 223 S.E.2d 227 (1976).
59. Id. at 178, 223 S.E.2d at 228.
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It is hoped that Pennsylvania will follow the direction of the commonwealth court, as evidenced by that court's affirmation of the
0 as well as the trend of
appeal board's decision in Squillacioti,1
several other states,' and permit recovery for stress heart attacks.
Compensability falls within the parameters of the new law and,
properly understood, the 1972 legislative standard is not an irrational "giveaway" by the legislature to the workman. Indeed, the
new legislative standard and its budding interpretations in the area
of stress heart attacks should reflect an effort on the part of the legal
community to fashion guidelines for recovery that are medically
acceptable and realistically permit compensation for this malady
which affects thousands of men and women in the work arena.
60. No. A-69097 (Work. Comp. App. Bd. April 17, 1975).
61. See notes 53-59 and accompanying text supra. See also Leming v. Federal Pac. Elec.
Co., 59 N.J. 512, 284 A.2d 182 (1971), where a compensation award was allowed for a heart
attack induced by additional work and pressure on the job. Decedent engineer, for two weeks
prior to his death, had worked overtime every night, which he had never been required to do
before. He left for a business trip at 6 a.m. on the day preceding the heart attack and did
not return home until 8 p.m. The additional work and pressure, it was held, had a marked
debilitating effect on him and precipitated the heart attack.

